Theory Guard_Yahalom (Isabelle2005: October 2005)

# Theory Guard_Yahalom

Up to index of Isabelle/HOL/Auth

theory Guard_Yahalom
imports Guard_Shared
begin

    (******************************************************************************
    date: march 2002
    author: Frederic Blanqui
    email: blanqui@lri.fr
    webpage: http://www.lri.fr/~blanqui/

    University of Cambridge, Computer Laboratory
    William Gates Building, JJ Thomson Avenue
    Cambridge CB3 0FD, United Kingdom
    ******************************************************************************)

    header{*Yahalom Protocol*}

    theory Guard_Yahalom imports Guard_Shared begin

    subsection{*messages used in the protocol*}

    syntax ya1 :: "agent => agent => nat => event"

    translations "ya1 A B NA" => "Says A B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}"

    syntax ya1' :: "agent => agent => agent => nat => event"

    translations "ya1' A' A B NA" => "Says A' B {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}"

    syntax ya2 :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => event"

    translations "ya2 A B NA NB"
    => "Says B Server {|Agent B, Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}"

    syntax ya2' :: "agent => agent => agent => nat => nat => event"

    translations "ya2' B' A B NA NB"
    => "Says B' Server {|Agent B, Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}"

    syntax ya3 :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => key => event"

    translations "ya3 A B NA NB K"
    => "Says Server A {|Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},
                        Ciph B {|Agent A, Key K|}|}"

    syntax ya3':: "agent => msg => agent => agent => nat => nat => key => event"

    translations "ya3' S Y A B NA NB K"
    => "Says S A {|Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}, Y|}"

    syntax ya4 :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => msg => event"

    translations "ya4 A B K NB Y" => "Says A B {|Y, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|}"

    syntax ya4' :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => msg => event"

    translations "ya4' A' B K NB Y" => "Says A' B {|Y, Crypt K (Nonce NB)|}"

    subsection{*definition of the protocol*}

    consts ya :: "event list set"

    inductive ya
    intros

    Nil: "[]:ya"

    Fake: "[| evs:ya; X:synth (analz (spies evs)) |] ==> Says Spy B X # evs:ya"

    YA1: "[| evs1:ya; Nonce NA ~:used evs1 |] ==> ya1 A B NA # evs1:ya"

    YA2: "[| evs2:ya; ya1' A' A B NA:set evs2; Nonce NB ~:used evs2 |]
    ==> ya2 A B NA NB # evs2:ya"

    YA3: "[| evs3:ya; ya2' B' A B NA NB:set evs3; Key K ~:used evs3 |]
    ==> ya3 A B NA NB K # evs3:ya"

    YA4: "[| evs4:ya; ya1 A B NA:set evs4; ya3' S Y A B NA NB K:set evs4 |]
    ==> ya4 A B K NB Y # evs4:ya"

    subsection{*declarations for tactics*}

    declare knows_Spy_partsEs [elim]
    declare Fake_parts_insert [THEN subsetD, dest]
    declare initState.simps [simp del]

    subsection{*general properties of ya*}

    lemma ya_has_no_Gets: "evs:ya ==> ALL A X. Gets A X ~:set evs"
    by (erule ya.induct, auto)

    lemma ya_is_Gets_correct [iff]: "Gets_correct ya"
    by (auto simp: Gets_correct_def dest: ya_has_no_Gets)

    lemma ya_is_one_step [iff]: "one_step ya"
    by (unfold one_step_def, clarify, ind_cases "ev#evs:ya", auto)

    lemma ya_has_only_Says' [rule_format]: "evs:ya ==>
    ev:set evs --> (EX A B X. ev=Says A B X)"
    by (erule ya.induct, auto)

    lemma ya_has_only_Says [iff]: "has_only_Says ya"
    by (auto simp: has_only_Says_def dest: ya_has_only_Says')

    lemma ya_is_regular [iff]: "regular ya"
    apply (simp only: regular_def, clarify)
    apply (erule ya.induct, simp_all add: initState.simps knows.simps)
    by (auto dest: parts_sub)

    subsection{*guardedness of KAB*}

    lemma Guard_KAB [rule_format]: "[| evs:ya; A ~:bad; B ~:bad |] ==>
    ya3 A B NA NB K:set evs --> GuardK K {shrK A,shrK B} (spies evs)"
    apply (erule ya.induct)
    (* Nil *)
    apply simp_all
    (* Fake *)
    apply (clarify, erule in_synth_GuardK, erule GuardK_analz, simp)
    (* YA1 *)
    (* YA2 *)
    apply safe
    apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies)
    (* YA3 *)
    apply blast
    apply (drule_tac A=Server in Key_neq, simp+, rule No_Key, simp)
    apply (drule_tac A=Server in Key_neq, simp+, rule No_Key, simp)
    (* YA4 *)
    apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies in_GuardK_kparts)
    by blast

    subsection{*session keys are not symmetric keys*}

    lemma KAB_isnt_shrK [rule_format]: "evs:ya ==>
    ya3 A B NA NB K:set evs --> K ~:range shrK"
    by (erule ya.induct, auto)

    lemma ya3_shrK: "evs:ya ==> ya3 A B NA NB (shrK C) ~:set evs"
    by (blast dest: KAB_isnt_shrK)

    subsection{*ya2' implies ya1'*}

    lemma ya2'_parts_imp_ya1'_parts [rule_format]:
         "[| evs:ya; B ~:bad |] ==>
          Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}:parts (spies evs) -->
          {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}:spies evs"
    by (erule ya.induct, auto dest: Says_imp_spies intro: parts_parts)

    lemma ya2'_imp_ya1'_parts: "[| ya2' B' A B NA NB:set evs; evs:ya; B ~:bad |]
    ==> {|Agent A, Nonce NA|}:spies evs"
    by (blast dest: Says_imp_spies ya2'_parts_imp_ya1'_parts)

    subsection{*uniqueness of NB*}

    lemma NB_is_uniq_in_ya2'_parts [rule_format]: "[| evs:ya; B ~:bad; B' ~:bad |] ==>
    Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}:parts (spies evs) -->
    Ciph B' {|Agent A', Nonce NA', Nonce NB|}:parts (spies evs) -->
    A=A' & B=B' & NA=NA'"
    apply (erule ya.induct, simp_all, clarify)
    apply (drule Crypt_synth_insert, simp+)
    apply (drule Crypt_synth_insert, simp+, safe)
    apply (drule not_used_parts_false, simp+)+
    by (drule Says_not_parts, simp+)+

    lemma NB_is_uniq_in_ya2': "[| ya2' C A B NA NB:set evs;
    ya2' C' A' B' NA' NB:set evs; evs:ya; B ~:bad; B' ~:bad |]
    ==> A=A' & B=B' & NA=NA'"
    by (drule NB_is_uniq_in_ya2'_parts, auto dest: Says_imp_spies)

    subsection{*ya3' implies ya2'*}

    lemma ya3'_parts_imp_ya2'_parts [rule_format]: "[| evs:ya; A ~:bad |] ==>
    Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}:parts (spies evs)
    --> Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}:parts (spies evs)"
    apply (erule ya.induct, simp_all)
    apply (clarify, drule Crypt_synth_insert, simp+)
    apply (blast intro: parts_sub, blast)
    by (auto dest: Says_imp_spies parts_parts)

    lemma ya3'_parts_imp_ya2' [rule_format]: "[| evs:ya; A ~:bad |] ==>
    Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}:parts (spies evs)
    --> (EX B'. ya2' B' A B NA NB:set evs)"
    apply (erule ya.induct, simp_all, safe)
    apply (drule Crypt_synth_insert, simp+)
    apply (drule Crypt_synth_insert, simp+, blast)
    apply blast
    apply blast
    by (auto dest: Says_imp_spies2 parts_parts)

    lemma ya3'_imp_ya2': "[| ya3' S Y A B NA NB K:set evs; evs:ya; A ~:bad |]
    ==> (EX B'. ya2' B' A B NA NB:set evs)"
    by (drule ya3'_parts_imp_ya2', auto dest: Says_imp_spies)

    subsection{*ya3' implies ya3*}

    lemma ya3'_parts_imp_ya3 [rule_format]: "[| evs:ya; A ~:bad |] ==>
    Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}:parts(spies evs)
    --> ya3 A B NA NB K:set evs"
    apply (erule ya.induct, simp_all, safe)
    apply (drule Crypt_synth_insert, simp+)
    by (blast dest: Says_imp_spies2 parts_parts)

    lemma ya3'_imp_ya3: "[| ya3' S Y A B NA NB K:set evs; evs:ya; A ~:bad |]
    ==> ya3 A B NA NB K:set evs"
    by (blast dest: Says_imp_spies ya3'_parts_imp_ya3)

    subsection{*guardedness of NB*}

    constdefs ya_keys :: "agent => agent => nat => nat => event list => key set"
    "ya_keys A B NA NB evs == {shrK A,shrK B} Un {K. ya3 A B NA NB K:set evs}"

    lemma Guard_NB [rule_format]: "[| evs:ya; A ~:bad; B ~:bad |] ==>
    ya2 A B NA NB:set evs --> Guard NB (ya_keys A B NA NB evs) (spies evs)"
    apply (erule ya.induct)
    (* Nil *)
    apply (simp_all add: ya_keys_def)
    (* Fake *)
    apply safe
    apply (erule in_synth_Guard, erule Guard_analz, simp, clarify)
    apply (frule_tac B=B in Guard_KAB, simp+)
    apply (drule_tac p=ya in GuardK_Key_analz, simp+)
    apply (blast dest: KAB_isnt_shrK, simp)
    (* YA1 *)
    apply (drule_tac n=NB in Nonce_neq, simp+, rule No_Nonce, simp)
    (* YA2 *)
    apply blast
    apply (drule Says_imp_spies)
    apply (drule_tac n=NB in Nonce_neq, simp+)
    apply (drule_tac n'=NAa in in_Guard_kparts_neq, simp+)
    apply (rule No_Nonce, simp)
    (* YA3 *)
    apply (rule Guard_extand, simp, blast)
    apply (case_tac "NAa=NB", clarify)
    apply (frule Says_imp_spies)
    apply (frule in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+, blast, simp+)
    apply (frule_tac A=A and B=B and NA=NA and NB=NB and C=Ba in ya3_shrK, simp)
    apply (drule ya2'_imp_ya1'_parts, simp, blast, blast)
    apply (case_tac "NBa=NB", clarify)
    apply (frule Says_imp_spies)
    apply (frule in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+, blast, simp+)
    apply (frule_tac A=A and B=B and NA=NA and NB=NB and C=Ba in ya3_shrK, simp)
    apply (drule NB_is_uniq_in_ya2', simp+, blast, simp+)
    apply (simp add: No_Nonce, blast)
    (* YA4 *)
    apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies)
    apply (case_tac "NBa=NB", clarify)
    apply (frule_tac A=S in Says_imp_spies)
    apply (frule in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+)
    apply (blast dest: Says_imp_spies)
    apply (case_tac "NBa=NB", clarify)
    apply (frule_tac A=S in Says_imp_spies)
    apply (frule in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+, blast, simp+)
    apply (frule_tac A=A and B=B and NA=NA and NB=NB and C=Aa in ya3_shrK, simp)
    apply (frule ya3'_imp_ya2', simp+, blast, clarify)
    apply (frule_tac A=B' in Says_imp_spies)
    apply (rotate_tac -1, frule in_Guard_kparts_Crypt, simp+, blast, simp+)
    apply (frule_tac A=A and B=B and NA=NA and NB=NB and C=Ba in ya3_shrK, simp)
    apply (drule NB_is_uniq_in_ya2', simp+, blast, clarify)
    apply (drule ya3'_imp_ya3, simp+)
    apply (simp add: Guard_Nonce)
    apply (simp add: No_Nonce)
    done

    end

### messages used in the protocol

### definition of the protocol

### declarations for tactics

### general properties of ya

lemma ya_has_no_Gets:

      evs ∈ ya ==> ∀A X. Gets A X ∉ set evs

lemma ya_is_Gets_correct:

      Gets_correct ya

lemma ya_is_one_step:

      one_step ya

lemma ya_has_only_Says':

      [| evs ∈ ya; ev ∈ set evs |] ==> ∃A B X. ev = Says A B X

lemma ya_has_only_Says:

      has_only_Says ya

lemma ya_is_regular:

      regular ya

### guardedness of KAB

lemma Guard_KAB:

      [| evs ∈ ya; A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad;
         Says Server A
          {|Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}, Ciph B {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
         ∈ set evs |]
      ==> GuardK K {shrK A, shrK B} (spies evs)

### session keys are not symmetric keys

lemma KAB_isnt_shrK:

      [| evs ∈ ya;
         Says Server A
          {|Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}, Ciph B {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
         ∈ set evs |]
      ==> K ∉ range shrK

lemma ya3_shrK:

      evs ∈ ya
      ==> Says Server A
           {|Ciph A {|Agent B, Key (shrK C), Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},
             Ciph B {|Agent A, Key (shrK C)|}|}
          ∉ set evs

### ya2' implies ya1'

lemma ya2'_parts_imp_ya1'_parts:

      [| evs ∈ ya; B ∉ bad;
         Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs) |]
      ==> {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} ∈ spies evs

lemma ya2'_imp_ya1'_parts:

      [| Says B' Server {|Agent B, Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|} ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ ya; B ∉ bad |]
      ==> {|Agent A, Nonce NA|} ∈ spies evs

### uniqueness of NB

lemma NB_is_uniq_in_ya2'_parts:

      [| evs ∈ ya; B ∉ bad; B' ∉ bad;
         Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs);
         Ciph B' {|Agent A', Nonce NA', Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs) |]
      ==> A = A' ∧ B = B' ∧ NA = NA'

lemma NB_is_uniq_in_ya2':

      [| Says C Server {|Agent B, Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|} ∈ set evs;
         Says C' Server {|Agent B', Ciph B' {|Agent A', Nonce NA', Nonce NB|}|}
         ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ ya; B ∉ bad; B' ∉ bad |]
      ==> A = A' ∧ B = B' ∧ NA = NA'

### ya3' implies ya2'

lemma ya3'_parts_imp_ya2'_parts:

      [| evs ∈ ya; A ∉ bad;
         Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs) |]
      ==> Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs)

lemma ya3'_parts_imp_ya2':

      [| evs ∈ ya; A ∉ bad;
         Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs) |]
      ==> ∃B'. Says B' Server {|Agent B, Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}
               ∈ set evs

lemma ya3'_imp_ya2':

      [| Says S A {|Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}, Y|} ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ ya; A ∉ bad |]
      ==> ∃B'. Says B' Server {|Agent B, Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}
               ∈ set evs

### ya3' implies ya3

lemma ya3'_parts_imp_ya3:

      [| evs ∈ ya; A ∉ bad;
         Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|} ∈ parts (spies evs) |]
      ==> Says Server A
           {|Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},
             Ciph B {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
          ∈ set evs

lemma ya3'_imp_ya3:

      [| Says S A {|Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}, Y|} ∈ set evs;
         evs ∈ ya; A ∉ bad |]
      ==> Says Server A
           {|Ciph A {|Agent B, Key K, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|},
             Ciph B {|Agent A, Key K|}|}
          ∈ set evs

### guardedness of NB

lemma Guard_NB:

      [| evs ∈ ya; A ∉ bad; B ∉ bad;
         Says B Server {|Agent B, Ciph B {|Agent A, Nonce NA, Nonce NB|}|}
         ∈ set evs |]
      ==> Guard NB (ya_keys A B NA NB evs) (spies evs)